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Abstract:
Testing is the predominant software quality assurance method today, but it
has a major flaw — it cannot reliably catch race conditions, intermittent errors
caused by factors that cannot be controlled during testing, such as unpredictable
timing behaviour in concurrent software.
We present entropy injection, a extension of traditional test methods, which
enable developers to create tests for arbitrary types of race conditions in any
software application, reusing the application’s existing test cases. An entropy
injector runs the software under test in an instruction set simulator, where all
factors that normally are unpredictable can be explicitly controlled. The injec-
tor provokes race condition defects by artificially changing the timing behaviour
of the simulated processors, hardware devices, clocks, and input models. Pro-
voked defects can be debugged by developers in a non-intrusive, programmable
debugger, which allows race condition defects to be reproduced and provides
access to all software state in a distributed system. Developers can use its ser-
vices to create application-specific injection strategies and directed regression
test cases that monitor application state and test specific interleavings of events.
Our proof-of-concept entropy injector implementation Njord is built on Nornir,
a debugger environment based on the complete system simulator Simics. Njord
provokes test case failures by suspending simulated processors, thereby injecting
delays in the processes in a concurrent application. We demonstrate Njord on
a small test routine, and show how a developer can write a race condition
regression test that triggers errors with very high probability, or provoke errors
with good probability without using application knowledge.
Keywords: entropy injection, noise making, race condition, complete system
simulation, full system simulation, Nornir
1 Introduction
In the early days of computing, almost all programs were functional — the pro-
grams read data, performed a computation, and produced output data. Pro-
gram output depended only on the input data. We call this functional behaviour
or determinism, and it implies that program executions are reproducible. It is
a very convenient property from a quality assurance perspective. If a developer
can assume that a certain input data set results in the same output data for
every execution, he only needs to execute a certain test scenario once in order
to ensure that the scenario will work properly when the program is put in pro-
duction. Reproducibility is also an unusual property in engineering. In other
engineering disciplines, one cannot safely assume that a particular test execu-
tion is representative for all test executions with a certain input. The result
of running a product test of a physical product or machine is also determined
by factors that cannot be completely controlled, such as temperature, moisture,
material fatigue, exact timing, fuel quality, corrosion, etc.
Reproducibility allows software developers to use test case based testing
with automated regression test suites as the primary defect detection method.
When a defect has been detected, the developer debugs the failing scenario and
understand the defect in order to correct it. The execution of a functional com-
puter program can usually be observed without affecting the result, e.g. by
using a symbolic debugger, or inserting print statements. This is referred to as
non-intrusive debugging/observation, or absence of probe-effect. If a defect in a
deterministic program can be non-intrusively observed, it can be debugged by
repeating the program execution, each time obtaining more information about
the erroneous behaviour. Eventually, the developer will trace the error symp-
toms back to the error source. This procedure is called cyclic debugging.
Regression testing in combination with cyclic debugging is cost-effective, in
comparison to other quality assurance methods in engineering. It is therefore
the predominant software quality assurance method today.
Software has changed, however, and most programs today are nondetermin-
istic and cannot be fully observed and debugged without affecting the execution.
Traditional test methods allow test engineers to control most factors that affect
execution, such as input data and hardware and software environment config-
uration. Some factors, for example process scheduling order and input arrival
times, are typically outside the testers’ control. Software applications therefore
have intermittent defects caused by such uncontrollable execution factors. The
most common type of intermittent defect is race conditions, defects dependent
on uncontrollable timing factors. Since we have no cost-effective method for
detecting race conditions, they are common in production software.
Race conditions are becoming increasingly common as computer systems be-
come more concurrent and asynchronous. The drift towards more concurrent
computer systems is gradual but inevitable. It started early in the history of
computing, with the introduction of asynchronous hardware services, such as
imprecise traps, and with reactive programs, which receive new input data dur-
ing execution. Programs that receive interrupts or input data asynchronously
1
become sensitive to arrival times and ordering of interrupts and input data, and
are therefore not deterministic. The nondeterminism in computer systems has
continued to increase with the introduction of multitasking operating systems,
multiprocessor machines, and networked computers. Recently, the processor
vendors have unanimously concluded that it is not worthwhile to spend more
efforts and silicon on improving single-thread performance. Instead, they put
multiple processor cores on each chip. This change in technology will force soft-
ware vendors that care about performance to write parallel software, and to
convert their existing sequential software. Developing parallel software is in-
herently difficult, and race conditions are frequently introduced in the process.
The proliferation of multicore processors will therefore drastically increase the
need for test methods that are capable of detecting race conditions.
Most previous research in race condition detection has focused on detecting
data races in homogeneous shared memory programs. There are tools that
either analyse and report suspicious memory access behaviour, or control the
behaviour of a single normally uncontrollable factor, e.g. process scheduling,
and apply heuristics to explore new scheduling interleavings. Existing methods
are able to detect some race conditions, but leave some factors uncontrolled,
and do not achieve full reproducibility.
Entropy injection, described in this paper, is a simulation-based test method
where all factors affecting test execution are explicitly controlled. Its main
purpose is to provide means for developers to create directed regression test
cases for detecting all classes of race condition defects. An entropy injector
artificially changes timing and interleaving of events in the simulated system,
and enables race condition defects to be reliably caught within the traditional
test and debug process, something that has previously not been possible for
software in general purpose computer systems. An entropy injector is built
on a holistic debugger [Alb06b], a programmable debugging environment that
provides non-intrusive access to all software state in a distributed system, and
developers can use the holistic debugging services to create race condition stress
tests (aka noise makers) guided by application-specific monitoring. Moreover,
entropy injection places minimal requirements on the application under test, and
is applicable for testing all types of applications, including distributed systems
with heterogeneous hardware, operating systems, middleware, and programming
languages, and for detecting errors involving multiple abstraction layers. We
will mostly use simple shared variable accesses as examples; they are simple
to explain and easy to reason about. The reasoning does not assume shared
storage, however, and applies equally well to similar scenarios in all classes of
systems.
We have built a proof-of-concept entropy injector, Njord, in the holistic
debugging environment Nornir, which is based on the complete system simulator
Simics [MCE+00]. We demonstrate Nornir with a unit test of a simple routine,
and show how unguided random injection has little effect, whereas injection
strategies that monitor application progress or targets a specific known bug
provoke defects with high probability.
We will discuss race conditions in more detail and propose some new race
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condition taxonomy in the next section. Nornir and holistic debugging will be
described briefly in Section 3 and entropy injection is described in Section 4.
Section 5 contains a description of Njord and the simple demonstration. Related
work is described in Section 6, some discussion regarding entropy injection as a
method in Section 7, and conclusions in Section 8.
2 Race conditions
There are a number of different definitions of race conditions (or races for short).
In this paper, the most general definition the author was able to find will be
used: “A condition in which two or more actions for an operation occur in
an undefined order” [MBKQ96]. In other words, a race condition occurs in
a concurrent system when two (or more) processes (A and B) race towards
some points in their execution (Ac and Bc, respectively). No program construct
controls whether Ac or Bc occurs first, and the execution path and the result of
the program depends on the outcome of the race. Hence, a race condition makes
the program execution and its results nondeterministic. Processes participating
in a race need not be computational processes that execute instructions, but may
also be other processes contributing to system progress, such as communication
channels or clocks.
A race condition is born when some event in program execution happens
and creates the race between A and B. We will call this event the race opening.
It is usually the execution of an instruction in either A or B, but not necessarily.
The opportunity of a race exists until either Ac or Bc occurs. We will call the
event that either Ac or Bc happens the race closure, and the period of time
between race opening and race closure a race window. Race windows are often
short, and one closure is often much more likely than other closures. We will
call this closure the common race closure. The common closure does usually not
cause a program error — if it did, the developer could easily fix the error. We
will call less likely closures uncommon race closures, or erroneous race closure
if they cause an incorrect execution of the program. An erroneous race closure
is also called triggering a race condition, since in many texts concerning race
conditions, the uncommon closure is assumed to be erroneous. We will use the
term race event as a common name for all events affecting race conditions. An
execution of a concurrent system can be specified as the initial system state,
the input to the system, and the interleaving of race events.
A race condition can involve more than two processes. In order to keep
the examples simple, we will only describe races between two processes in this
article. The reasoning and methods described in the article apply to any number
of racing processes, however.
A common form of race condition is a data race [SBN+97, AHB03], which
occurs when processes access a variable in shared memory without using a syn-
chronisation mechanism that prevents simultaneous access, and at least one of
the access operations is a write. In the example illustrated in Figure 1, two





















Figure 1: Data race.
a store instruction. The race window opens when a process executes the load
instruction. The common closure occurs when the same process executes the
store instruction. The uncommon closure occurs when the other process exe-
cutes the load instruction (which opens another race as the processes race to
the store instruction).
Some previous attempts to define race conditions are unnecessarily restricted
to data races [NM92, HM94]. This is understandable, as data races is the only
type of races that has received significant research attention. In this paper, we
will instead use the broader definition above of racing processes connected in an
arbitrary manner, which is applicable also to distributed systems without shared
storage, and to race conditions that include non-computational processes.
2.1 Malign and benign races
A race condition is not a defect in itself. Most programs have expected non-
deterministic behaviour. For example, in database applications, it is common
to have multiple processes racing to commit transactions, and in multithreaded
programs, threads often race to acquire locks. In these cases, all possible execu-
tion path resulting from a race condition are correct executions of the program.
We will call these types of races benign races. In other cases, one of the exe-
cution paths leads to incorrect application behaviour. We will call such race
conditions malign races.1
1Helmbold and McDowell [HM94] use the term critical races, which the author considers
somewhat misleading.
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There is no generally applicable method for distinguishing a malign from a
benign race. Whether an execution path is correct or not is subjective. The
most popular form of distinguishing correct execution paths from incorrect paths
is to run test cases and check the result. The race detection method we present
therefore assumes that the application developer supplies test cases and some
mechanism for detecting incorrect executions. This requirement is typically easy
to fulfill, since applications with quality requirements tend to have automated
regression test suites, which can be used without modification.
There are classes of races that are uncommon in correct programs, and it
makes sense to construct tools that report such races as potential programming
errors. Tools for detecting unsynchronised accesses to shared data are discussed
in the related work section 6.
Figure 2 illustrates pseudo code for a simple race condition that is neither
obviously benign or malign. The output of the program will be “6” on most
executions, but can also be “5”, although it is unlikely. If “6” is the only
expected output from this application, the race condition is malign, whereas it
is benign if 5 is also an acceptable output. If we assume that the expected output
is “6”, and the race is malign, this example has two important properties: there
is no concurrency pattern that can be identified as anomalous (the program
uses correct synchronisation), and there is no result that can be easily identified
as erroneous (classifying an incorrect execution requires an external oracle and
a test harness). Many race conditions in industrial software have these two
properties.
2.2 Classes of race conditions
Computer programs execute synchronously and deterministically most of the
time. In order for a race condition to occur, there must be some nondeterminism,
asynchrony, or concurrency present. Nondeterminism in computer systems can
either come from the program itself, the underlying system, or from the external
environment. We can classify causes for race conditions in the following groups:
Program concurrency Modern programs are often divided into multiple
threads or processes on one or more physical machines. If these processes
communicate, the program result becomes dependent on the scheduling
between these processes, and on the arrival times of messages sent between
them. The process communication can be explicit messages sent between
the processes, or accesses to shared storage, such as main memory, files,
database tables, tuple spaces, etc.
System nondeterminism There are various system services that have non-
deterministic or timing-dependent behaviour. These fall into the following
subcategories:
Asynchronous input/output Non-blocking and asynchronous I/O ser-
vices depend on the availability of input data or free buffers, and


























Figure 2: Example program with nondeterministic output.
is unpredictable. Services that poll for I/O completion, such as the
select and poll system calls also fall into this category.
Interrupts Services that interrupt normal execution, such as hardware
interrupts and Unix signals, may arrive at any point in execution,
and therefore cause nondeterminism.
Unpredictable system services Some system interfaces have nonde-
terministic results by definition. Some examples are entropy-based
random devices (e.g. /dev/random in Linux), clocks, and operating
systems with randomised address layout.
Run-time system execution Underlying run-time systems, such as
Java virtual machines, are designed to be mostly transparent, but in
some cases, their execution can be observed by the software running
in the virtual machine. For example, garbage collectors can affect
applications at arbitrary points in execution, since they invalidate
weak references and cause finaliser routines to execute. Moreover,
virtual machines with dynamic optimisation can change the program
code during execution if either the optimiser or the application has
defects.
Asynchronous hardware While processors are mostly synchronous
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from a software perspective, other hardware devices are not. De-
vices that perform direct memory access (DMA) can change memory
contents at arbitrary points in execution. The memory system itself
is asynchronous, and in a multiprocessor machine that provides a
weak memory consistency model (which most high-end multiproces-
sors do), the cache coherence protocol may reorder memory opera-
tions nondeterministically.
Environment nondeterminism Modern computer programs are reactive
and interact with the outside world, which is unpredictable in nature.
Input may appear at any time and in any order, and if the program ei-
ther receives interrupts when input arrives or polls for available input,
the arrival time and order affects execution. Moreover, high-availability
applications also need to handle faults in the services that the environ-
ment provides, for example hardware faults, timeouts, and communication
errors. These may appear at any time during execution.
Although many of the examples mentioned above refer to low-level services,
nondeterminism and asynchrony appear at all abstraction levels, and can gen-
erally not be avoided. Some asynchronous constructs, for example variables in
shared memory, are results from design or implementation decisions. They can
be circumvented with a different design, or by serialising the implementation
at a loss of performance. In many application scenarios, however, the problem
itself is concurrent and cannot be serialised. For example, an online store must
be able to serve multiple customers simultaneously; it is not acceptable to seri-
alise the implementation by having new customers wait until the first customer
has decided what items to buy.
2.3 Regarding the likelihood of triggering a race condition
Time spent executing a race window is usually small in comparison to time
spent outside race windows. If the race window is large, it can be triggered
easily during testing, and developers can debug and correct the program with
reasonable effort.
Figure 1a illustrates the typical execution scenario of a race condition —
the race window opens by a process and closes shortly thereafter by the same
process, and the likelihood that the race will be closed by another process and
get triggered is very small. In the case of a typical data race, there is a read-
modify-write sequence on each process, and the erroneous race closure only
triggers if a read from another process takes effect between the read and the
write. The race window is often small; in this data race example, the race
window is only a few instructions long. In contrast, the number of instructions
executed between the race windows is counted in billions or trillions. Hence, the
likelihood of an erroneous race closure is very small. One might think that the
probability of triggering an erroneous closure would be on the order of 10−9 to
10−12. Under some circumstances, however, the erroneous closure probability
becomes high enough to occasionally trigger under execution.
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As an example of a situation where the probability of an erroneous data
race closure becomes higher than usual, assume that the code in Figure 1a runs
on a large shared memory multiprocessor computer. If variable X is frequently
read by most nodes in the system, the data caches of most processors are likely
to contain the cache line corresponding to X in shared state in a MOSI cache
coherence protocol, i.e. most processors have the permission to read variable X.
When a processor enters the read-modify-write sequence, the load instruction
is processed quickly, since the load memory operation is a cache hit. The store
instruction, however, cannot be committed until the processor obtains the cache
line in owned state in MOSI. If many other processors store the cache line in
shared state, it may take a long time for the processor to receive write per-
mission to the cache line, perhaps on the order of thousands of cycles. Hence,
the probability of an erroneous race closure increases with several orders of
magnitude.
Another example where erroneous closure probability increases is when the
process executing the race window has to wait during window execution, for
example due to an I/O request or a cache miss. As an extreme case, consider
again the tiny race window in the read-modify-write sequence. If the sequence of
instructions happens to cross a virtual memory page boundary in the machine,
it may happen that the second memory page is absent from main memory and
resides on disk. Since a disk request requires tens of milliseconds, the race
window widens with about seven orders of magnitude.
Cache misses at various levels can also cause synchronisation among threads,
which can increase erroneous closure probability. Consider the case where both
processes in Figure 1 read the same file before executing the read-modify-write
sequence. If the file is absent from the file system cache when the first process
enters the sequence, it has to wait for it to be retrieved from disk. If the second
process executes the file read operating during this wait period, it will also
wait, and both processes will wake up when the file has been retrieved. Hence,
the processes will execute the read-modify-write sequence at approximately the
same time, which increases the probability of uncommon closure.
The bottom line of this section is that although erroneous race closures are
very unlikely in the most common scenarios, there are plausible scenarios where
they suddenly become likely and may affect software operation. These scenarios
cannot easily be predicted, and preproduction software testing can therefore
only catch a small fraction of the malign race conditions in an application. They
instead appear in production scenarios, when the software experiences new load
patterns, or is simply struck with bad luck, for example if race windows are
placed on virtual memory page boundaries. Malign race conditions can be very
expensive when experienced in production software, and there is therefore an
incentive for spending resources on detecting them during testing, even though
they are unlikely to appear in a given scenario.
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3 Nornir
Nornir is a test and debug environment designed for all classes of applications,
but focused on applications that have properties that make them difficult to
debug with traditional tools: concurrent, distributed, reactive, real-time, and
heterogeneous applications. Traditional quality assurance tools have fundamen-
tal limitations that prevent them from being applicable from these application
classes, and from scaling to complex applications:
1. All factors affecting execution cannot be controlled, as discussed above.
Therefore, intermittent defects often remain undetected in production
software.
2. Test executions are not reproducible. Hence, even if an intermittent defect
surfaces during testing, it cannot be reproduced and debugged.
3. The act of debugging and observing the system changes system behaviour.
This is called probe effect [Gai85] and has limited the power and popularity
of debuggers.
4. Traditional debugging tools only operate on a single process, at a single
abstraction layer, whereas the application logic may be spread over mul-
tiple processes and abstraction layers, and written in multiple languages.
Item one and two are consequences of computer vendors’ design decisions to
build asynchronous and nondeterministic computers — exact instruction execu-
tion times, and in some cases the results as well, are not architecturally specified.
Item three (and therefore also two) is a consequence of implementing observa-
tion facilities in the same system as the observed software. Item four is a side
effect of items two and three. It does not make sense to build and use scalable
debugging tools if the underlying observation services are unpredictable, and if
increased usage of observation services causes degradation in the accuracy of
observation due to probe effect.
Nornir therefore runs the software under test in a artificial, separate environ-
ment — an instruction set simulator, which is not affected by items 1–3 above.
It is therefore a suitable base for building testing and debugging tools, and for
creating scalable and automated debugging environments.
From a testing perspective, Nornir has a few unique properties:
• In Nornir, a failed test run can be reproduced and debugged with a variant
of the GNU debugger that does not affect the execution. Developers can
also write debugging routines that verify internal application state using
holistic debugging services, described in Section 3.2.
• Since a simulator is implemented in software, the simulation model can
be modified easily, and all factors affecting program execution can be con-
trolled by the test engineers and regarded as test input to the application.
In this paper, we show how testers can control ordering of all events, in-
cluding those with undefined ordering. Similar techniques can be used for
9
controlling time flow, occurrence of faults, unusual responses from hard-
ware or software services, etc.
• All software state can be observed from a programmable environment,
as described in Section 3.2. This increases debugging efficiency, since
developers can write debugging routines that validate internal state, and
these can later be reused by other team members. It is also useful for
writing white-box regression tests that compare internal state in different
parts of a distributed application, and for steering test input based on the
internal state of the application. Guided entropy injection, described in
Section 4, is an example of such steering.
3.1 Instruction set simulation
A discrete event simulator makes simulation progress by processing events; in an
instruction set simulator, the most common event is the execution of the next
instruction. The simulator has a time model, and for each instruction processed,
the simulated time is increased according to the time model. Time is quantified,
and we call the smallest representable time unit a simulation cycle or simply
a cycle. A cycle has a static time length, which often matches the period of a
simulated processor, e.g. 10 ns for a 100 MHz processor. In this article, we will,
unless otherwise noted, assume a simple time model, where each instruction
requires a single cycle and memory operations execute instantaneously.
There are also other types of events that are processed and contribute to
simulation progress. These are posted in event queues and processed when
simulated time reaches the value corresponding to each event. Models for simu-
lated non-processor entities use event queues to schedule the model processing
for hardware devices, input and environment models, communication devices,
and fault models.
3.1.1 Complete system simulation
Instruction set simulators have suitable characteristics to serve as debugging
platforms: they provide models that are detailed enough for running applica-
tions in binary form, but still run sufficiently fast to run large applications. We
have built Nornir on Simics [MCE+00], a complete system simulator (also called
full system simulator). A complete system simulator has models for all hardware
devices that provide services visible to software, i.e. processor, memory, disks,
network cards, etc. It is binary compatible with general purpose computers,
and runs unmodified commodity operating systems and applications in binary
form.
Simics can simulate multiprocessor machines and multiple networked com-
puters, which may be heterogeneous in architecture. It is designed to be deter-
ministic; if a simulation scenario starts in a well defined simulation state, and
the input model is synthetic and predictable, it will produce exactly the same
scenario for each simulation.
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Simics runs roughly two orders of magnitude slower than the host machine
when modelling a machine similar to the host. It is slow enough to be a sig-
nificant drawback for simulation as a method, but fast enough to allow large
applications to be observed. The simulation speed depends on the accuracy of
the timing model. We usually run with a coarse model, where every instruction
takes one clock cycle. This model is sufficient for detecting logical errors, which
is the scope of this article. If the simulator should be used for performance
analysis, a more accurate timing model may be desirable. Simics allows users to
model cache memory hierarchies, providing a good timing approximation with-
out sacrificing much simulation performance. It also supports detailed models
of processor pipelines, out-of-order execution, and speculative execution, at the
price of severe performance degradation. Magnus Ekman’s dissertation [Ekm04]
contains some benchmarks on Simics with different timing models. Complete
system simulator timing models have been validated and discussed by Gibson
et.al. [GKO+00].
Simics has two performance features that reduce the cost of simulation in
many scenarios. First, the entire state of the simulated system can be stored
to disk in a checkpoint and later retrieved. This feature may cut down exe-
cution time in scenarios where the test setup is costly, but may be reused for
multiple tests. Simics also performs idle loop detection, and fast forwards pro-
cessors waiting in the operating system’s idle loop to the next asynchronous
event. This improves simulation performance for I/O-bound workloads and
many distributed application scenarios.
A complete system simulator allows users to control all types of nondeter-
ministic behaviour mentioned in Section 2.2, either through services exported
by the simulator, or by developing simulation model extensions. The Simics
configuration used for the demonstrations below uses standard Simics device
and clock models, and a sequentially consistent memory model.
3.1.2 Time and clocks
If the simulated system has multiple processors, the simulator executes instruc-
tions on the processors in a round-robin order. Hence, the resulting simulation
is a serialisation of the concurrent execution of a distributed application. In
a simple simulator implementation, there will be a single simulated clock, and
each processor will execute at most one instruction in each simulation cycle. If
the processors have different frequencies, or if some instructions take more than
a cycle, some processors will stall in some of the cycles. Simulating all pro-
cessors each simulation cycle, however, has negative implications on simulation
performance, as it prevents some efficient implementation techniques. There-
fore, in an efficient simulator implementation, the simulator will execute a large
number of instructions on one processor before switching to another processor.
This simulated time period is called a time quantum, and is often on the order
of a thousand cycles or more. In such an implementation, each processor has
its own clock, and the clocks temporarily drift apart, at most a time quantum.
If the time quantum is small, software will not notice that there is a slight
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drift between the processors. If the time quantum is large, on the order of
seconds, and if multiple simulated clocks can be observed by software, it is
possible to write programs that observe time going backwards. In such scenarios,
the simulator may induce incorrect software behaviour, but these situations are
fortunately rare.
Software running outside the simulated world, such as device models and
observation software, can also observe multiple simulated clocks, which are tem-
porarily unsynchronised. Hence, when writing such software, one needs to be
careful and ensure that the software can handle decreasing time values. When
developing Nornir, we have several times noted that it is easy to make a mistake
and assume that clock readings always provide increasing values. In order to
simplify implementation of observation software, we have introduced two arti-
ficial clocks: head clock and tail clock, and the corresponding time scales head
time and tail time. The head clock value is the largest value of all simulated
clocks, and the tail clock value is the smallest simulated clock value. These
artificial clocks are monotonically increasing, and are therefore simpler to use
than dealing with multiple unsynchronised clocks tied to processors.
3.1.3 Memory consistency
A simulated symmetric multiprocessor machine with a shared main memory im-
plements a sequential memory consistency by default.2 The processors directly
access a single image of main memory, and the interleaving of memory transac-
tions follows the interleaving of simulated processor execution. If the simulated
machine includes a model of a cache memory hierarchy, the cache model typ-
ically only affects the time model, and does not model consistency effects of
data caching; the memory transactions still go directly to main memory, but
the instruction requires more than a single cycle.
A simulated machine with a sequential consistency model is insufficient if a
developer wants to test whether a shared memory application works correctly
in the presence of memory transaction reorderings on a multiprocessor machine
with a weak memory consistency. In order to test for software defects result-
ing from memory transaction reordering, one needs to implement a memory
consistency model where processors observe different memory images. Imple-
menting such a memory consistency model is possible if the simulator allows
user extensions to intercept and modify memory transactions. Such a model
could be created by improving upon an existing time model that implements
a realistic cache coherency protocol model, and make it also serve processors
with cached data. An alternative approach would be to add reorder buffers to
and/or from processors and any shared caches. These buffers could stall and
reorder data according to the architectural memory consistency model for the
2Actually, simulated multiprocessor machines provide an even stronger consistency model,
linearisability (with respect to a monotonically increasing global time, i.e. head time, tail
time, or time on a single processor). Software in the simulated system cannot distinguish
between sequential consistency and linearisability, however, and it is hard to come up with a
simulated scenario where it makes a difference, so the issue is mostly of academic interest.
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simulated machine. This could result in a complex implementation in the gen-
eral case, for relaxed consistency models. Stronger consistency models, such
as total store order (TSO) could probably be modelled with few and simple
reorder buffers, however. In the case of relaxed memory consistency models, it
may be more straightforward to use a separate copy of the entire main mem-
ory for each processor, and have reorder buffers that stall modifications from
other processors before they modify each processor’s main memory. Simics does
provide the necessary services to intercept and modify memory transactions,
and also a memory consistency controller, but the author is not aware of any
instruction-set simulator implementations of weak memory consistency models
for the purpose of software testing, and this area is future work.
3.2 Holistic debugging
Nornir is a framework designed for programmable, non-intrusive observation of
all system state that is visible to software, even in complex and distributed sys-
tems. We call such an observation environment a holistic debugger [Alb06b]. A
holistic debugger does not assume any properties of the system under test, ex-
cept that it must be feasible to simulate the hardware and external environment
(e.g. interactive users, sensor input). It assumes nothing about the software,
and supports non-intrusive debugging and comparisons of execution state in
multiple programs, written in different languages, at multiple abstraction lev-
els, running in multiple, heterogeneous computers, etc. Our implementation is
of course limited to a few configurations for practical reasons, but the concep-
tual method is free from the inherent limitations of traditional debugging and
analysis methods.
A complete system simulator provides non-intrusive access to all system state
visible to software. Unlike standard debuggers, which use probing services sup-
plied by the runtime system to probe the state of running processes, the holistic
debugger must use non-intrusive probing techniques, and cannot rely on runtime
system services. It probes the simulator for machine state, but the information
retrieved is raw, binary information. The information has been obfuscated by
symbolic transforms, i.e. compilers, and by machine transforms, i.e. virtual
machines and operating systems, and it is no longer easily comprehensible. In
order to make this information useful for a programmer, it must be translated
back to the abstraction level the programmer deals with, i.e. to variables and
types in the programming languages used in the application.
In a holistic debugger, there is an associated abstraction translation stack
for each inspected process in the simulated system. A translation stack con-
sists of symbol context probes and machine context probes, corresponding to
the language environments and virtual machines of the inspected process. The
structure is shown in Figure 3. When the user inspects a particular program,
a translation stack is instantiated. The top of the stack is a symbolic probe
that lets the user inspect the execution and state of the program, similarly to
a standard debugger. The symbolic probe queries the underlying machine con-
text probe for program state data. If the machine context refers to a physical
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Virtual machine context: process
Symbolic context: kaffe
Virtual machine context: JVM
Symbolic context: hello world
Debugger shepherd
User extensions
 Physical machine context:PC
Figure 3: Holistic debugger structure with example applications.
machine, the machine context probe forwards the query to the simulator. If the
machine context below is a virtual machine (e.g. a Java Virtual Machine or a
Unix process), however, the corresponding machine context probe is a virtual
machine translator (VMT). The VMT parses the virtual machine’s data struc-
tures, and maps virtual machine storage to storage in the underlying machine.
This parsing is done through the symbolic context probe for the underlying
program providing the virtual machine.
Nornir supports debugging applications in simulated Sparc/Linux systems,
written in a language supported by GDB. GDB acts as symbolic probe for
the applications. GDB requires a backend service that allows it to control and
probe a single Linux process. It therefore communicates with a Linux VMT that
translates GDB’s requests for virtual memory and register contents to the cor-
responding physical memory and registers contents, which are retrieved from
Simics. Breakpoints and other basic debugger services are handled similarly.
The VMT also exports services for suspending execution on events that are not
tied to a specific process, for example the start of a particular application or
arrival at a certain point in time. We call such generic breakpoints eventpoints.
When probing the kernel data structures, the VMT uses a static symbolic trans-
lator, a set of automatically generated classes that contain methods for parsing
kernel data structures in binary form. There is one such class for each type in
the kernel, and the static symbolic translator thereby provides a robust, strongly
typed programmable probing system for the kernel.
Abstraction translation stacks enable users to probe software state at arbi-
trary level, in any process, without affecting the execution. In order to debug a
distributed application, the user can attach a symbolic debugger to each partic-
ipating process, or write automated debugging routines. In a holistic debugger,
all symbolic probes are connected to a debugger shepherd, a programmable
global debugger that allows debugging routines to probe the state of the entire
system. Nornir’s debugger shepherd, Verdandi, is written in Python and pro-
vides a Python programming interface. It creates an instance of GDB for each
process the user wishes to monitor. The user validates internal state by writing
monitoring routines, called causal path monitors, that observe a data flow path
by waiting for a set of eventpoints to trigger, probe application state via GDB,
wait for a new set of eventpoints, etc. Causal path monitors run independently
of each other and concurrently. The causal path monitors can be saved an reused
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in future debugging sessions, or used as white-box tests in regression testing.
The user can also define application-specific eventpoints, and use causal path
monitors to determine when the eventpoints should be triggered. Examples of
useful application-specific eventpoints would be the arrival of a specific class of
http request or an SQL query matching a specific pattern.
A holistic debugger is a program observation framework that places minimal
requirements on the system under test, and it works for arbitrary distributed
software systems. Nornir is a research prototype and has limited capabilities
that are suited for our experiments, but the method itself makes very few as-
sumptions. It assumes that it is feasible to simulate the system under test and
its external input, and the holistic debugging services require a virtual machine
translator for each abstraction layer involved. In practice, this requires source
code access to the virtual machine, or that the virtual machine or operating
system vendor supplies a translator. Source code access to all parts of the
application is not required, however, and errors in binary components can be
detected, reproduced, and reported to the vendor.
The holistic debugging concept and Nornir’s implementation is described in
more detail in the author’s previous works [Alb06b, Alb06a].
4 Entropy injection
In order to detect race conditions during testing, one must put the software
under more stress that it will experience when put into production. Trying to
increase the general stress level by raising the load is not effective — it is likely
that the program would execute a few set of execution paths and event interleav-
ing patterns over and over again. Instead, one should strive to push the software
under test to go through new event interleavings that can possibly appear when
the software is put in production, but are unlikely to appear during lab testing.
This is technique bears some resemblance to fault injection, a well established
technique for testing high-availability features. Instead of injecting component
faults that the application is supposed to handle, however, one injects timing
chaos, and ensures that the application handles it gracefully. We will therefore
call this technique entropy injection, and the mechanism or tool that performs
the injection will be called an entropy injector.
Consider again the common data race scenario in Figure 1a. The race win-
dow is small and the program is spending most of the time executing outside
the race window. Hence, the uncommon closure is unlikely to occur. In order
to determine whether the application executes correctly in both possible sce-
narios, one should provoke the uncommon race closure, run the application to
completion, and have a test oracle determine the correctness. By preventing
thread A from making progress, the race window is artificially expanded and
the uncommon closure is provoked, as illustrated in Figure 4. In the general
case, controlling computation progress is difficult or infeasible in real computers,
but with a computer system simulator, one can modify the machine model and
achieve an artificial delay in the process executing the race window. How to
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perform this injection in practice is described in Section 4.1.









Figure 4: Provoking a race condition by artificial delay injection.
If the application is run in a simulator, and the location of race windows
are known, one can provoke different race closures in an application, and use
the test suite’s oracle to determine whether the application is correct or not.
Unfortunately, developers do not know where the race windows are; if they did,
it would be easy for them to correct the program. Instead, in order to test for
race conditions, the locations of race windows must be guessed by the injection
mechanism, potentially guided by an application developer.
Searching through the whole state space of all possible interleavings of race
events is usually infeasible; the state space is too large for applications with non-
trivial communication patterns. Instead, the injector inserts delays at points
in execution that could be within a race window. It should avoid repeatedly
testing the same potential race windows and the same interleaving patterns, and
strive towards test coverage in terms of event interleaving. For example, if one
wants to test for malign races resulting from interleaving of communication in a
distributed application, inserting multiple delays in one process only improves
coverage if the process has communicated with other processes between the
delays. Hence, the injector needs a strategy in order to make educated guesses
on where to insert delays that provoke application errors. Entropy injection
strategies are discussed in Section 4.2.
An injector inserts delays randomly, with a pseudo-random number gener-
ator. When an error has been provoked and reported by the test suite, the
developer can reproduce the failing execution by using the same random seed,
and debug the error in the traditional cyclic manner, either interactively with a
non-intrusive symbolic debugger, or programmatically with a holistic debugger.
Since entropy injection relies on the application’s test suite to distinguish
correct executions from incorrect executions, there will be no false positive re-
ports. Thus, even in cases where there is an apparent race condition, for example
a data race where a variable is accessed without proper synchronisation, but the
16
application contains logic for preventing unsynchronised accesses, or if all race
closures result in an execution that is deemed correct, the test suite only looks
at the final result and does not produce false error reports. The absence of false
positives is an important improvement over static and dynamic race condition
detection tools (described in Section 6, which can only warn about suspicious
concurrent program behaviour according to heuristics, and tend to produce nu-
merous false positive reports.
4.1 Execution flows
In order for an injector to affect the interleaving of unsynchronised events, it
can either modify the state of the software, or control the progress of simulated
entities in the system. Modifying the software state is undesirable for a number
of reasons: It means that the released software is not the software tested, it can
complicate reasoning about test coverage, and it can make it difficult to deter-
mine whether provoked errors can appear in real systems. Since all interleavings
of race events that are feasible in a real machine can be provoked by controlling
the progress of simulated entities in an appropriate manner, the latter method
is sufficient for most test scenarios, and the one we have pursued.
The simulation model can be thought of as having multiple simulation flows,
where each flow corresponds to the progress of a simulation entity. If a flow is
enabled, the modelled entity performs as usual, but if the flow is disabled, the
entity is stalled and makes no progress. In normal simulation, all flows are
enabled and the simulation progresses as usual. An injector may disable flows
in order to provoke new interleavings of machine events. The progress of a flow
can affect the execution actively, for example by inserting event notifications
in the event queue. It can also affect the execution passively, e.g. a modelled
temperature sensor that only yields values when polled by software. For a
passive flow, progress means that subsequent polls may yield different values; a
disabled passive flow yields a fixed value. Simulation flows can be categorised
as follows:
Processor flows There is a processor flow associated with each simulated pro-
cessor. Processor flows only affect the simulation actively, by executing
instructions. A disabled processor flow corresponds to a stalled processor,
which is prevented from executing instructions.
Device flows Each simulated device processes requests from software and re-
sponds through interrupts, direct memory access (DMA), or by memory-
mapped I/O. A device flow can be both active and passive. A disabled
device flow inserts no events in the event queue, and values read from its
mapped memory region remain fixed.
Input flows The simulation scenario has a synthetic input model for each of
the external sources of input affecting the simulation, for example human
users, network sources, and temperature. Since external input is received
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by the simulated computers by hardware devices, input flows overlap with
device flows.
Communication flows Each communication link between nodes in the sim-
ulated system has its corresponding flow. When a communication flow is
disabled, the data on the link are queued and delivered when the flow is
enabled again.
Clock flows The flow of time also affects simulation, and race conditions where
a process races against the clock are common. Hence, a complete entropy
injector should be able to achieve arbitrary interleavings with the progress
of processes and the progress of simulated time. In order to achieve ar-
bitrary interleavings, the simulator must be able to halt a clock while
executing instructions on the corresponding processor, and to forward the
clock without executing instructions.
Memory consistency flows A memory consistency flow corresponds to data
transfers in the cache coherency mechanism of a multiprocessor machine.
Disabling and enabling memory consistency flows affects the order in which
memory operations are observed.
Fault injection flows Each simulated device with a fault injection model has
a corresponding fault injection flow. Faults are only injected if the flow is
enabled.
A particular class of flows can be enabled and disabled if the simulation
model provides an appropriate service or allows supplying user-defined models
for entities. Adding the ability to control clock flows and memory consistency
flows require some support from the simulator core for an efficient implementa-
tion, but controllability for the other classes of flows are easy to implement.
At each point during simulation, a non-empty set of flows are enabled. We
will call such a set of enabled flows a flow configuration. An entropy injector
alternates between flow configurations, and thereby achieves desired interleav-
ings of hardware events. It is not necessary that all possible flows in a simulated
scenario are considered in the flow configuration selection process. It may be the
case that some flows do not significantly affect the software under test, or that
the simulator implementation does not allow control over some flows. Flows
that are not explicitly controlled by the injector are either implicitly enabled or
connected to another flow.
In most test scenarios, detecting the race conditions that can appear would
only require controlling one or a few types of flows. When testing multithreaded
applications on simulated multiprocessor computers, controlling the processor
flows is a simple strategy for triggering races between multiple threads. Indi-
vidual threads can be suspended by disabling the processor they are currently
running on. If a multithreaded application runs on a simulated uniprocessor
computer, however, disabling the only processor does not achieve the desired
effect. Instead, the injector must alternate disabling the processor flow and the
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clock flow in order to provoke the operating system to schedule a new thread
when desired. In a test scenario with an application distributed over multiple
nodes, controlling the time flow is less important for provoking race conditions,
and controlling processor flows, communication flows, and communication fault
injection flows may be more appropriate. Some classes of flows, such as mem-
ory consistency flows and hardware fault injection flows, will usually not be
necessary to control, except for certain classes of applications.
The flow model matches the simulation setup well when the simulation has
a static set of flows that correspond to simulated entities that all process events
serially, e.g. processors or input devices. It does not match equally well to
entities that do not process events serially, e.g. communication links that reorder
messages, memory systems with weak consistency, etc. One could support a
dynamic number of flows, or map dynamic flows to a static set of flows, but it
could complicate the injector implementation and potentially have performance
implications. The author believes that the flow model will have to be revised
and extended as more experience is gained with entropy injection, but that it is
sufficient for creating entropy injectors that are theoretically capable of catching
most classes of race conditions.
The flow classes mentioned above are all low-level flows, corresponding to
the level of simulation that we are using. If a simulator that model computers
at another abstraction levels is used, flows at that abstraction level would be
appropriate. For the purpose of testing application race event interleavings, it
may be more useful to control flows at higher abstraction layers, for example
processes or database transactions. This is discussed further in Section 4.2 and
there are examples in Section 5.1.
4.2 Injection strategies
An injector can insert artificial delays in execution by alternating between flow
configurations. Inserting delays completely randomly is unlikely to be effective
in most cases, however. If an application test suite with an injector is run
infinitely many times, all intermittent defects will be found, if the test suite can
detect them and the injector can provoke them with the set flows it controls.
Unfortunately, since the number of possible race event interleavings is large, it
would take an unreasonable number of test executions to find all race conditions
in an application.
An entropy injector therefore needs an injection strategy that searches
through the space of possible interleavings in an intelligent manner, inserts
delays where the application is likely to be vulnerable to race conditions, and
avoids excessive testing of redundant test cases that have equivalent interleav-
ings of application events. A strategy is comprised of multiple combined injec-
tion tactics. Most tactics are provoking and have notions of where race windows
are located, and strive to insert delays in randomly picked race windows. If a
race window is hit and a sufficiently large delay is inserted when the window is
open, there is a good chance that some process will execute an uncommon race
closure. For example, a tactic for provoking concurrency errors in a database
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could insert delays in processes that have started transaction processing, but
not yet completed commit phase. A provoking tactic typically concentrates on
a particular type of event that is assumed to be important for race event inter-
leavings in the application under test, and distributes injections with uniform
probability over these events.
In theory, any instruction or event in a process in the system can affect other
processes. A very simple injection tactic could have each flow enabled for a ran-
dom number of instructions (or other events), and then disable the flow until
a random number of instructions have been executed in other flows. We will
call this tactic RandomTime. If the random numbers are picked from an open-
ended random distribution, e.g. an exponential distribution, RandomTime can
trigger any intermittent error. RandomTime regards all executed instructions
as equally important, and inserts evenly distributed delays over the dynamic
stream of executed instructions. RandomTime is a simple but unguided tactic,
and therefore not sufficient for triggering defects on its own, which is demon-
strated in Section 5.2.
In practice, only a few types of events will affect interprocess communication
in a given application. These events are typically unevenly distributed over the
instruction stream, and RandomTime will therefore produce many equivalent
and redundant test cases while missing relevant test cases. As an example, as-
sume that a developer wants to test a distributed application for defects that
depend on the order of messages sent between the nodes. RandomTime would
probably generate many redundant test cases where delays are injected at dif-
ferent points in execution that have no communication event between them,
illustrated in Figure 5b. It would also miss injecting delays in many interesting
cases where there are two communication events separated by a small number of
instructions. Such cases, shown in Figure 5c, are desirable to test and increase
test coverage.






Figure 5: Redundant and coverage improving test cases.
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An injector will be more effective if its strategy involves guided tactics, which
monitor execution events that are likely to affect race event interleavings, and
distribute delays randomly and evenly over these events. Such tactics can be
general, and insert delays at events that are likely to be race events in many
applications, e.g. shared variable accesses or interprocess communication. They
can also be domain- or application-specific, and insert delays at application
events known to be sensitive to races, for example at telephone call state transi-
tions, during online software upgrades, or during database transaction commit
phases.
A tactic that only needs to monitor events at the hardware level can be
implemented on a simulator without a holistic debugger. Tactics for provoking
defects in high-level applications, however, will need to monitor events on an ab-
straction layer above the hardware, such as events in a Unix or Java process, and
must rely on a holistic debugger to provide the necessary programmable debug-
ging services. A tactic can follow the progress of an execution flow at a higher
abstraction level by using holistic debugger services to place process-specific
eventpoints on the monitored process, e.g. code breakpoints, data watchpoints,
or time breakpoints. When the tactic determines that the monitored process
should be delayed, it manipulates an appropriate hardware flow to achieve this
effect. It is straightforward to delay a process by disabling the processor it is
running on. It is also possible to affect operating system’s process scheduling by
fast forwarding the clock, thereby forcing timer interrupts and thread preemp-
tion. Similar techniques may be used in order to force other run-time systems
to control flows at higher abstraction layers.
If a holistic debugger is unavailable, it is possible to create other means
for monitoring high level application events and controlling high level flows, by
manipulating the code or the state of the operating system or the application
under test. Such test scenarios would be intrusive, however, and the software
under test would differ from production software. Intrusion has a number of
disadvantages; it may mask defects that cannot be found due to the modifica-
tions, it may trigger defects that cannot appear in real systems, it complicates
test configuration, and it complicates reasoning about test coverage. In some
cases, however, it can be a more cost-effective solution if the holistic debugger
can be replaced with simpler debugging services.
An aggressive injector can create simulated scenarios that can never appear
on real machines, and these scenarios can potentially trigger false defects that
can never appear in production. In such scenarios, some device exhibits be-
haviour that violates the assumptions made by the application designers. For
example, if an injector delays a disk device and it therefore takes a few seconds
for it to respond, the operating system device driver may report a timeout error,
and if the application does not handle the error gracefully, it will fail. In this
case, if the application designers has decided that disks are assumed to work,
and that any failures resulting from disk failures are acceptable, this test case
is invalid, and should not be reported as a failure. Applications can also fail if
the simulated machine violates some basic assumptions made by software. Con-
sider a simulated scenario with multiple processors, each having its own clock.
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If the simulated clocks are artificially delayed and drift apart, the operating
system could perform a clock reading on one processor, and later another clock
reading on another processor, this time resulting in an earlier time value. Such
anomalies may confuse the operating system or other software on the system,
and cause application failures.
In order to avoid creating false positive reports, developers can write detec-
tion routines that identify invalid test cases when a timeout or similar undesired
execution pattern appears, and discard the results of these tests. An alterna-
tive method for avoiding false positive reports is to use restrictive tactics, which
prevent the simulated machines from exhibiting unrealistic behaviour by limit-
ing the duration of artificial delays. Such a tactic would monitor the progress
of a simulated entity, and if the entity is delayed for an unreasonable amount
of time, or falls behind related entities, the restrictive tactic would enforce the
entity to become enabled in order to avoid anomalous system behaviour.
An injector holds a number of active tactics, combined to a strategy. The
tactics of a strategy have different priority, and high priority tactics get the
first opportunity to affect the flow configuration. Lower priority tactics can
decide to enable or disable flows that have not been decided by higher priority
flows. Restrictive tactics need to have high priority in order to take effect. The
guided tactics that are expected to accurately guess the likely locations of race
conditions should have medium priority. Unguided tactics can be added at a low
priority, with the purpose to add noise and provoke local variations of similar
execution patterns.
Tactics can also be composite, and combine multiple subtactics. A composite
tactic could use all subtactics or alternate between them, either randomly or
depending on application behaviour. Composite tactics allow developers to
create arbitrary hierarchies with tactics.
5 Njord
We have implemented a simple entropy injector, Njord, as an extension to
Nornir. The purpose of Njord is to demonstrate a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation, and to gain some understanding of how the method behaves in practice
by studying test executions with simple, synthetic test scenarios. Njord injects
artificial delays by controlling processor flows, which is sufficient for provoking
most race conditions on multiprocessor computers and in distributed systems.
Other flows in the simulated system, e.g. clocks, hardware devices, etc, are en-
abled and progress as usual according to the simulation model. Njord supports
the same simulated platform that Nornir supports, i.e. simulated UltraSPARC
systems running Linux.
5.1 Njord injection strategies
Njord implements two simple, generic entropy injection tactics. More com-
plicated, application-specific tactics are likely to be more effective for realistic
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applications, but these simple tactics allow us to demonstrate how an applica-
tion developer could provoke race conditions and write a regression test case,
and to gain some understanding of entropy injection behaviour.
A Njord injection strategy consists of a list of tactics, ordered by priority.
Tactics are responsible for monitoring execution events they consider interesting
by using appropriate eventpoints, and can decide to request flow configuration
reevaluation when an eventpoint is triggered. When reevaluation is requested,
Njord iterates over the tactics in priority order. Each tactic can set a flow to
enabled, disabled, or leave it to be decided by lower priority tactics. No tactic
may disable all flows. After consulting all tactics, Njord sets all undecided flows
to enabled, imposes the new flow configuration on the simulator, and resumes
simulation.
Tactic implementations use holistic debugger services to monitor events of
interest. Since a holistic debugger can monitor arbitrary software events, tactics
can react on any type of eventpoint in a simulated system, e.g. code execution,
memory access, time eventpoints, process creation and termination, file access,
network message reception, web server query, and database table access. Hence,
injection strategies can be used for provoking malign race conditions at any
abstraction level.
5.1.1 RandomTime
The first implemented tactic is RandomTime, as described in Section 4.2.
Pseudo code for RandomTime is shown in Figure 6. It imposes a flow con-
figuration with a random set of processors enabled, waits for a (exponentially
distributed) random number of cycles, and repeats the procedure. RandomTime
has two configurable parameters: the number of processors enables (Processors-
Enabled) and the average delay period (Delay).
while (true) {
enableAllProcessors();
while (numProcessorsEnabled() > ProcessorsEnabled)
disableProcessor(random() \% numProcessors());
do {
nextFlowChange = currentCycle() + randomExponential(Delay);
awaitOneOf(CycleCount(nextFlowChange),
FlowConfigurationChanged());
} while (currentCycle() != nextFlowChange);
}
Figure 6: Pseudo code for RandomTime tactic.
As discussed below, RandomTime alone is not sufficient for provoking de-
fects, but it is useful for adding random noise to the entropy injection, which
can prevent all test runs from reexecuting a small set of patterns. It can also
be used as a restrictive tactic in order to limit the delays introduced by other
tactics, in this case with a long Delay setting and ProcessorsEnabled set to the
number of processors in the system.
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5.1.2 RandomInstruction
The second implemented tactic, RandomInstruction, spreads delays evenly in
a static set of instructions, in contrast to RandomTime, which spreads its de-
lays evenly over the dynamic set of executed instructions. The assumption of
RandomInstruction is that there is a race window open when a certain code
statement is executed, and if the injector injects a delay when that statement is
executed, the race is likely to manifest. The pseudo code for RandomInstruction
is shown in Figure 7. The basic algorithm is simple: Set a number of break-
points at random addresses in the application’s processes. When one of the
breakpoints are hit, inject a delay in the corresponding process by disabling the
processor that hit the breakpoint. Disable all breakpoints, wait for a random
number of cycles, enable the processor again and reenable the breakpoints that
have not yet been not hit. The breakpoint addresses are automatically obtained
from debug information generated when the program was compiled.
RandomInstruction has a number of parameters. The AddressRegions pa-
rameter allows developers to specify the set of instructions that are candidates
for breakpoints. The current implementation of RandomInstruction is adapted
to multiple threads that run identical program code in one address space. An
implementation for processes with multiple address spaces would be slightly
different, but have similar complexity. The Fraction parameter specifies the
number of breakpoints, as a fraction of the address region size. There is also a
Fallthrough parameter, which the developer can use to specify a probability that
a breakpoint should be ignored when hit. This gives some chance of triggering
defects that do not appear the first time the faulty piece of code is executed.
When performing a full application test, the normal procedure would be
to run the application with an injector, and then repeat the whole scenario a
number of times, but with different random seeds. When testing multithreaded
functions or modules, however, calling the module under test multiple times
from a test driver program is more efficient. In this case, the injector should
reconsider the set of breakpoints between the invocations of the module under
test. There is therefore a ProcessThreshold parameter, and whenever the num-
ber of application processes drops below this number, the tactic restarts the
algorithm, ensuring that each iteration of the module test is run with a new
set of breakpoints. The ProcessThreshold parameter is not necessary for Ran-
domInstruction to operate, but illustrates how developers can use application
knowledge to improve test performance.
If processes in the application under test communicates with a regular mech-
anism, for example with global variable accesses, network messages, or database
accesses, developers can create similar strategies for spreading injections evenly
over communication events deemed important. In this case, the strategy would
follow the same pattern, but the execution breakpoints would be substituted




if (numApplicationProcesses() == 0)
awaitOneOf(ProgramStart());
else if (numApplicationProcesses() < ProcessThreshold)
awaitOneOf(ProcessCreation(), ProcessDestruction());
else {
for (i = 0; i < max(AddressRegions.size() * Fraction, 1); ++i)
breakpoints.add(insertRandomBreakpoint(AddressRegions));
while(numApplicationProcesses() >= ProcessThreshold) {
event = awaitOneOf(BreakpointHit(breakpoints),
ProcessDestruction());
if (event.type() == BreakpointHit) {
if ((random() \% 1000) > (Fallthrough * 1000)) {
breakpoints.remove(event.breakpoint());
disableProcessor(event.processor());
delayEnd = cycleCount() + randomExponential(Delay);




if (delayEvent.type() == ProcessDestruction) {
if (numApplicationProcesses() < ProcessThreshold()) {
breakpoints.clear();









Figure 7: Pseudo code for RandomInstruction tactic.
5.2 Demonstration
In order to demonstrate how entropy injection behaves in practice, we have
arranged a scenario with a unit test for a simple multithreaded routine that
contains a race condition. The routine, increment n, creates n threads that
perform some random work, and then increment a shared variable, sum. The
variable increment is performed without using synchronisation, and there is a
typical data race, as described in Section 2. In case the uncommon window
closure occurs, it is detected by comparing sum with n. Figure 8 shows the
pseudo code for increment n, the routines it calls, and a unit test. The numbers
S and R change for the experiments.
The example is contrived, but is representative in the sense that the race
window is very short, the program performs lots of activities in between, and




for (i = 0; i < N - 1; ++i)
threads[i] = thread_create(increment_one);
increment_one();




spinAmount = random() \% S;
for (i = 0; i < spinAmount; ++i)
doRandomWork();
++sum; // Lock missing here.
}
doRandomWork() {
switch (random() \% x) {
case 0: readAFile(); break;
case 1: writeAFile(); break;
case 2: doSomeSystemCalls(); break;
case 3: fibonacci(); break;
case 4: useSomeMemory(); break;





for (i = 0; i < R; ++i) {
sum = 0;
increment_n(2);




Figure 8: Pseudo code for the test example.
5.2.1 Test results on real hosts
When run on real machines, the race in the example above triggers, but only
rarely. Statistics from running the test program on a variety of multiprocessor
machines, ranging from very old to modern, are shown in Figure 9. The following
machines were used for the test runs:
brahma Sun SPARCstation 10, 2 x 40 MHz SuperSPARC
scheutz Sun Ultra Enterprise 4000, 8 x 250 MHz UltraSPARC II
r2d2 2 x 600 MHz Intel Pentium III
millennium Sun Fire T1000, 1 x 1 GHz UltraSPARC T1, 6 cores, 4
threads/core
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host S E seconds
brahma 1 0 253
brahma 10 0 3057
brahma 100 0 42K
brahma 1K 2 126K
scheutz 1 0 57
scheutz 10 0 691
scheutz 100 0 19K
scheutz 1K 0 181K
r2d2 1 21K 162
r2d2 10 0 644
r2d2 100 0 2885
r2d2 1K 1 81K
millennium 1 0 117
millennium 10 0 1573
millennium 100 0 14K
millennium 1K 0 117K
saruman 1 0 5421
saruman 10 0 3270
saruman 100 0 37K
saruman 1K 0 59K
scaramanga 1 0 20.1
scaramanga 10 0 141
scaramanga 100 0 1145
scaramanga 1K 0 20K
Figure 9: Race statistics, real machines. R = 1M for all runs.
saruman 1 x 2.4 GHz Intel Pentium 4, 2 threads/core
scaramanga 2 x 3.0 GHz Intel Xeon, 2 threads/core
In most of the configurations, the race never triggered. In some cases, the
speed of thread creation happens to match the amount of work done by the
main thread, and there is a realistic chance of an uncommon race closure. As
we can see in the section below, even simple injectors improve the chance of
erroneous race closure significantly. The figures presented here should not be
interpreted as a quantitative comparison between testing on real and simulated
machines; debugging race conditions with standard methods is not an option,
since errors cannot be reproduced.
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5.2.2 Test results with entropy injection
We have run the example test routine above in Nornir, using injection strategies
with different variations of RandomTime and RandomInstruction tactics. The
simulated machine, bagle, is a dual processor 167 MHz UltraSPARC II running
SuSE Linux 7.3, obtained from a standard Simics 3.0.23 distribution. Five
different injection strategies have been used, with two different values for the
Delay parameter:
none No entropy injection activated.
time RandomTime tactic only, with no analysis of the software under test.
program RandomInstruction tactic. The AddressRegions parameter is set to
the entire address range of the program under test, which is statically
linked. The Fraction parameter is set to 0.001 and Fallthrough is zero.
ProcessThreshold is set to three, which makes Njord reset the breakpoints
when increment n has finished.3
function RandomInstruction tactic with same parameters as above but Ad-
dressRegions set to the instructions of increment n.
regression RandomInstruction tactic with same parameters as above,
but AddressRegions set to the two-instruction window in the
load/increment/store sequence.
Statistics from simulated scenarios are shown in Figure 10. The column
“E/R” shows the measured frequency of erroneous race closures per iteration.
The none strategy uses no entropy injection, and serves the purpose of ver-
ifying that races are no more likely to trigger in a simulated machine than in
real machines.
The time strategy illustrates that unguided injection strategies are ineffec-
tive at provoking defects, even in a simple program, such as this.
The other strategies based on RandomInstruction are more useful strategies,
and do manage to provoke errors with a reasonable probability. As expected,
the probability of triggering a race increases as the breakpoint address range
decreases.
The program strategy is a noise maker, and does not require the developer
to guide the injection. It guesses that some statement anywhere in the program
contains a race condition that can trigger if a delay is inserted. In spite of guess-
ing breakpoints among more than 100,000 instructions, it manages to provoke
a few races.
The function strategy illustrates the case where the programmer has a good
hint on where to search, or where the developer has domain-specific knowledge
about routines with high defect density.
3The pthreads implementation in SuSE Linux 7.3 creates an extra maintenance thread —
hence three threads and not two.
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injection Delay bkpts S code E / R injections cycles / injection
size / R injection ratio
none 0 n/a 1 n/a 0 0 0 0
none 0 n/a 10 n/a 0 0 0 0
none 0 n/a 100 n/a 0 0 0 0
none 0 n/a 1K n/a 0 0 0 0
time 10M n/a 1 n/a 0 0.131 10M 0.5
time 10M n/a 10 n/a 0 7.91 9972K 0.5
time 10M n/a 100 n/a 0 8.07 10M 0.5
time 10M n/a 1K n/a 0 8.74 10M 0.5
time 100M n/a 1 n/a 0 0.126 98M 0.5
time 100M n/a 10 n/a 0 8.74 100M 0.5
time 100M n/a 100 n/a 0 8.64 99M 0.5
time 100M n/a 1K n/a 0 9.12 99M 0.5
program 10M 105 1 421K 0.001 0.528 9236K 0.493
program 10M 105 10 421K 0.001 0.42 8855K 0.49
program 10M 105 100 421K 0 1.95 9328K 0.454
program 10M 105 1K 421K 0 2.21 9917K 0.213
program 100M 105 1 421K 0.001 0.449 89M 0.499
program 100M 105 10 421K 0.004 0.418 96M 0.499
program 100M 105 100 421K 0 1.96 94M 0.495
program 100M 105 1K 421K 0.001 2.05 94M 0.437
function 10M 1 1 296 0.02 0.756 10M 0.497
function 10M 1 10 296 0.025 0.728 9912K 0.496
function 10M 1 100 296 0.015 0.721 6715K 0.377
function 10M 1 1K 296 0 0.748 10M 0.104
function 100M 1 1 296 0.024 0.762 102M 0.5
function 100M 1 10 296 0.022 0.722 99M 0.5
function 100M 1 100 296 0.021 0.719 57M 0.483
function 100M 1 1K 296 0.021 0.735 65M 0.338
regression 10M 1 1 8 0.867 0.999 9625K 0.498
regression 10M 1 10 8 0.761 0.999 9769K 0.498
regression 10M 1 100 8 0.718 1 3727K 0.425
regression 10M 1 1K 8 0.04 1 9837K 0.152
regression 100M 1 1 8 0.917 0.999 103M 0.5
regression 100M 1 10 8 0.895 1 100M 0.5
regression 100M 1 100 8 0.896 0.999 19M 0.488
regression 100M 1 1K 8 0.863 1 25M 0.401
Figure 10: Race statistics, simulated machines with entropy injection. R = 1000
for all runs. Bkpts = number of breakpoints.
The regression strategy uses RandomInstruction tactic with same param-
eters as above, but AddressRegions set to the two-instruction window in the
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load/increment/store sequence. It approximates the best possible strategy that
one can hope to achieve in practice — a strategy that only injects delays in race
windows. It is also an example of how a race condition regression test can be
written. When a developer has discovered a race condition that involves one or
more code statements, he can write a strategy that injects delays when those
statements are executed. After verifying that the new strategy is capable of pro-
voking the defect he found, he corrects the defect and adds the new test to the
regression test suite. If another developer adds incorrect code that contends for
the same resource without using proper synchronisation, it is now likely to be
discovered during regression testing. The results above show that regression
provokes races with a high probability, sufficient for regression testing, as long
as the Delay value is high. Since the shared variable has a known address in
this scenario, regression could also have been implemented by using read and
write watchpoints instead of execution breakpoints. The implementation would
have been similar, and the results identical. The use of execution breakpoints,
however, is applicable to more scenarios.
If a developer has discovered a malign race condition, and an execution path
that leads to it, he can also create more explicit regression tests by writing
strategies that place breakpoints at statements that were executed before the
race, probe application state, and provoke a specific interleaving pattern that
triggers an erroneous race closure. This variant of regression testing is slightly
more complex and will not be demonstrated here.
In the statistics, we can see that the frequency of races triggered goes down
as the value of S increases, in particular for the Delay value of 10M. When the
amount of work before the race window exceeds the Delay value, the injected
delay can come to an end before the uncommon race closure occurs, even if a
breakpoint was set at the right address. A high Delay parameter is probably
preferable in most cases, but long delays injected outside race windows have a
performance cost.
The average number of delays injected per iteration is shown in the “injec-
tions / R” column and the average number of cycles injected per injection in
the column “cycles / injection.” The average number of cycles / injection is
usually smaller than the delay parameter value, since some delays are cut short
when the number of threads drops below the value of ProcessThreshold. The
last column shows the number of injected cycles divided by the total number
of simulated cycles (counting both simulated instructions and cycles in disabled
processors).
5.2.3 Performance
Simulation performance is somewhat important for entropy injection. Better
performance allows for more test runs, which increases the probability of discov-
ering a defect. Simics performs about two orders of magnitude slower than the
host machine. It is also used for other purposes and is therefore flexible. There
are many configuration parameters and control options selectable at runtime,
and this flexibility comes at the cost of lower performance. There are simulators
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or emulators that have more limited use cases and perform better, less than 10
times slower than the host, but we are not aware of any that are deterministic
and supply the adequate programming interfaces to be useful for programmatic
debugging and entropy injection. It is not known what performance a simulator
that only supplied the necessary services would achieve.
Performance statistics for the simulated scenarios above, which were exe-
cuted on the computer scaramanga (see Section 5.2.1) are shown in Figure 11.
The column “simulated seconds” shows the number of seconds that elapsed in
the simulated world. The column “simulated instructions” shows the number of
instructions executed by the simulator, i.e. excluding cycles elapsed on disabled
processors. The next column shows the number of seconds elapsed in the real
world and the last column the quota between the previous two columns.
The performance of the none strategy represents the base Simics perfor-
mance. Test setup incurs some overhead, and longer tests tend to achieve
higher performance than short tests. The program strategy suffers from low
performance, and all tests for function and regression takes approximately
the same time to execute. This indicates that the cost of resetting the Random-
Time tactic, i.e. setting and removing breakpoints limits performance. Nornir’s
virtual address breakpoint implementation is designed to avoid complexity and
not for simulation performance. There are several simple ways to improve break-
point performance, for example by adding a virtual memory translation cache.
In this scenario, there is approximately a factor of five (for S = 1000) in potential
performance gain before Simics’s base performance is reached. We have decided,
however, not to pursue optimisations that add complexity and state, since man-
aging complexity and correctness are the major challenges in implementing an
entropy injector.
The time strategy shows an interesting increase in number of instructions
per second in comparison to simulations without entropy injection. This is prob-
ably caused by the Simics’s idle loop detection; when one processor is stalled,
the thread running on the other processor ends up waiting for its sibling to
terminate, and the simulator detects that the processor is idle and skips ahead.
This indicates that injecting a delay only has a small cost in simulation time;
if a delay is injected in a thread executing the application’s critical path, the
other processors wait in the idle loop and are simulated at high speed. If a delay
is injected in a thread that is not executing the critical path, the application
execution time does not increase.
Although simulation performance is important, it is not crucial for the
method’s applicability. There will always be scenarios, for example systems
with a few communicating low-end embedded processors, where simulation on
high-end workstations is faster than real world execution. Likewise, there are
scenarios at the other end of the system size scale, e.g. peer-to-peer applications
with millions of nodes, that are unfeasible to simulate with existing simulation
technology. The performance of an implementation determines how large sys-
tems it is applicable for. Moreover, it is only necessary to trigger a defect once
in order to reproduce and debug the problem. During development of an ap-
plication, the application test suite can be executed many more times than we
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injection Delay S simulated simulated host instructions
seconds instructions seconds / second
none 0 1 0.174 80M 1488 53K
none 0 10 0.334 134M 1495 89K
none 0 100 12.8 4316M 1518 2841K
none 0 1K 192 64G 1975 32M
time 10M 1 0.444 1315M 1521 864K
time 10M 10 464 78G 1980 39M
time 10M 100 478 81G 1979 41M
time 10M 1K 513 87G 2104 41M
time 100M 1 0.211 12G 1550 8007K
time 100M 10 5171 880G 6278 140M
time 100M 100 5049 857G 6179 138M
time 100M 1K 5311 903G 6485 139M
program 10M 1 29.4 5022M 96K 52K
program 10M 10 22.5 3871M 94K 41K
program 10M 100 119 21G 187K 116K
program 10M 1K 305 80G 200K 401K
program 100M 1 238 40G 98K 408K
program 100M 10 239 40G 92K 436K
program 100M 100 1111 188G 190K 992K
program 100M 1K 1311 248G 189K 1306K
function 10M 1 45.3 7660M 9979 767K
function 10M 10 43.2 7319M 9975 733K
function 10M 100 38.1 7997M 9750 820K
function 10M 1K 214 64G 10K 6055K
function 100M 1 465 78G 10K 7597K
function 100M 10 426 71G 10K 7039K
function 100M 100 254 44G 9933 4458K
function 100M 1K 421 93G 10K 8807K
regression 10M 1 57.4 9699M 10K 914K
regression 10M 10 58.3 9857M 10K 931K
regression 10M 100 26.1 5047M 10K 493K
regression 10M 1K 192 54G 10K 5043K
regression 100M 1 615 103G 10K 9503K
regression 100M 10 597 100G 10K 9172K
regression 100M 100 116 20G 10K 1946K
regression 100M 1K 192 38G 10K 3612K
Figure 11: Simulation performance.
have resources to do for the example in this article. Since test executions are
independent, they can be run in parallel on farms of cheap commodity comput-
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ers, and also take advantage of the predicted rapid increase in number of cores
per processor over the coming years.
6 Related work
Detecting software concurrency defects has been a major challenge in computer
science for a long time, but only marginal progress has been made. One of the
thickest books on software testing by Binder [Bin99] spends one of its 1191 pages
on the issue, concluding that race conditions and other concurrency errors are
common problems, and suggests running multiple test processes concurrently
and randomising process start intervals. This brief treatment illustrates the
industrial state of the art practice.
There are various ad-hoc, application-specific methods involving stressful
load, random thread suspensions, artificial resource consumption, etc. This
is called noise making or controlled execution. A noise maker can either be
an irritator, which steals resources by creating additional load on the system,
or it can take control over one factor that is normally nondeterministic, ei-
ther message arrivals or thread scheduling, and add noise to its behaviour.
There are implementations of generic noise makers for message-passing sys-
tems [DKF93, DKF94] and for Java virtual machines [Sto02, EFG+03]. The
noise added is either completely random, white noise, or guided by various
heuristics [BAEFU06, Eyt05, SA06], for example shared variable access mon-
itoring [BFU03, BAFE03] or coverage analysis [EFN+02]. Noise makers have
similarities with entropy injectors, but since only one factor is controlled, full
reproducibility is not achieved, and race conditions relating to other factors
cannot be detected. Moreover, noise makers attempt to provoke defects with
application-independent heuristics or state space search, whereas the primary
purpose of entropy injection is to provide the ability to write guided regression
test cases for race conditions.
There exists a few methods for detecting data races in shared memory pro-
grams. The most popular method is called dynamic race detection, and several
research implementations [YRC05, AHB03, HR01, BHPV00] and some indus-
trial strength implementations [Int, Val] exist. Dynamic race detectors monitor
shared memory references and synchronisation operations made by the software
under test. These are analysed according to the lock set algorithm [SBN+97],
the vector clock algorithm [RB00], or a combination thereof. Pairs of con-
current load/store or store/store memory accesses that were not separated by
synchronisation, and could have been executed in a different order are reported.
Such pairs indicate nondeterministic program behaviour, and often indicate pro-
gramming errors. Dynamic race detection does not require a comprehensive test
suite, and is a cost-effective method for finding the defects that it is capable of
detecting. Unlike entropy injection, however, it is only capable of detecting
a limited class of race conditions in a particular homogeneous shared memory
environment. Moreover, it only reports nondeterministic behaviour in possible
execution paths that are close to the path that was executed. Dynamic race
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detectors also tend to produce false positive reports, which must be manually
inspected and suppressed by the user.
There are also static code analysis tools for detecting some concurrency
errors [NAW06, PFH06, EA03, HJMS03, QW04], such as missing locks around
shared variable accesses. Static analysis tools are even more limited in the types
of errors they can detect than dynamic analysis tools and also produce false
reports, but they are easy to use and integrate into the development process.
Yu et al. and Havelund et al. have written good overviews of static and dynamic
race detection tools [YRC05, HSU03].
Malign race conditions that appear during execution on real machines can
be replayed and debugged with a runtime system that logs asynchronous events
in sufficient detail to replay the full execution. This technique is called deter-
ministic replay [LMC87], and can be performed at several abstraction levels,
for example with hardware support [XBH03], virtual hardware [KDC05], spe-
cialised operating systems [TH00], process interception [GASS06], or in virtual
machines [KSC00]. Deterministic replay requires intrusive support in the system
under test, and it is usually only capable of replaying single nodes or homoge-
neous nodes in a distributed system, but exceptions exist [KSC00, GASS06].
Implementations for multiprocessor computers are rare [Dun06], and limited in
functionality and performance, since logging cache-to-cache transfers is infeasi-
ble without hardware support. There are several good overviews on determinis-
tic replay techniques [Sai05, DFD06, Hus02, CGC+03], and we will not mention
all variations here.
Virtualisation programs, such as Xen [DFH+03], are similar in nature to sim-
ulators, but they are generally not isolated from nondeterministic input from the
outside world, and can therefore not provide deterministic execution. Pervasive
debugging, a method for deterministic debugging of distributed applications
running in Xen domains [HHH04], can be regarded as a light-weight version
of a subset of holistic debugging. Virtualisation achieves better performance
than instruction-set simulation, but provides more limited observability and
only supports distributed systems with homogeneous hardware.
Pervasive debugging and deterministic replay are less expressive debugging
methods than holistic debugging. The implementations are typically focused on
interactive debugging of a limited number of similar processes, and provide no
support for automation. They do not include an abstraction translation stack,
and either support observing a single abstraction layer, or in the case of the
pervasive debugger, require modifications to the virtual machine of each process
observed [Ho05]. These techniques are primarily useful for debugging problems
that appear with high probability on real machines. Without entropy injection,
they cannot increase the probability of triggering race conditions. A pervasive
debugger could potentially be a platform for creating an entropy injector if it, in
addition to standard interactive debuggers, supported programmable debugging
services, which can be used by the injector.
Model checking is a method that can be used for verifying concurrency prop-
erties of distributed algorithms. Developers create state machine models of a
system’s processes, and specify system invariants. A model checker, for exam-
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ple SPIN [Hol97], performs random system executions based on the models and
reports violations of system invariants. If the state space is sufficiently small,
a complete search can be made, or various formal methods can be applied on
the model. The required extra work of creating models and ensuring that they
match the implementation makes model checking cost-ineffective for most ap-
plications, but it is popular in academia and for some industrial scenarios, for
example verification of communication protocols. The method, however, is re-
stricted to detecting errors that are present in the state machine model, which
is a simplified approximation of the real implementation, and it cannot detect
lower level defects.
The use of simulation for quality assurance is an integrated part of the de-
velopment process for almost all types of complex engineering products, with
the exception of software products. Designs for cars, ships, buildings, bridges,
and aeroplanes are always tested under simulated stressful conditions before
construction. For these products, achieving the quality levels required today
is either impossible or economically infeasible without simulation. In computer
hardware engineering, testing with register transfer level (RTL) or gate level
simulation is the main verification methodology. Concurrency errors are de-
tected by injecting artificial timing variations in communication devices, with-
out violating specifications. RTL simulation is very slow, between six and ten
orders of magnitude slower than the host machine, and a high-end server has
only been tested for a very short simulated time period before tape out. Yet,
through careful crafting of test cases and timing variation injection, the quality
level achieved in highly concurrent hardware systems is much higher than in
concurrent software systems of comparable complexity.4
7 Discussion
Simulating a computer system under test and injecting random timing varia-
tions is a näıve, brute force approach to race condition detection, in contrast
with traditional research approaches for concurrency error avoidance, which are
based on various forms of intelligent program analysis or strict programming
paradigms. Any program analysis, however, must assume properties of the
analysed system, and therefore narrows the applicability to specific classes of
systems. The author has striven to minimise the assumptions required for en-
tropy injection, and entropy injection is designed to be applicable for all types
of intermittent errors in all types of software systems. The example scenario
above involves a threaded shared memory program running in a multiprocessor
machine. This scenario was chosen because it is easy to create, set up in a
simulation, and explain in an article. Entropy injection does not assume shared
memory nor homogeneity, however.
The injection strategies demonstrated are deliberately kept simple in order to
4Unfortunately, the author has failed to find an appropriate literature reference for this
claim. Innovation in practical hardware verification is driven by high-end hardware vendors,
who do not publish their methods in academic press.
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illustrate that even minimal dynamic program analysis is sufficient for provoking
defects with high probability. More sophisticated program analysis or model
checking can be added as injection strategies. It is likely that this would improve
test efficiency, but possibly at the cost of generality. This is left for future work,
along with many research questions: How well does entropy injection work for
different types of real-world applications? How does one measure and reason
about test coverage? Do generic entropy injectors work sufficiently well, or
do we need application-specific injectors? Can we automate choices of injector
parameters?
An entropy injector with an intelligent strategy may be able to unravel most
malign race conditions in an application with a good test suite. Achieving
high coverage in terms of race event interleavings, however, will require test
engineering effort. Entropy injection may become a method that automatically
finds some race conditions without developer guidance, but it should primar-
ily be regarded as technology that enables application developers to explicitly
control all factors affecting execution and thereby test for race conditions.
8 Conclusions
We present entropy injection, an incremental improvement over traditional test
methods that enables application developers to test for arbitrary types of race
conditions. An entropy injector is built on a simulation-based holistic debug-
ger. The underlying simulator is deterministic and provides explicit control
over factors that usually make test executions nondeterministic, such as process
scheduling and time flow. Developers can use the holistic debugger to monitor
application state and steer injection of timing variations to stress test sensitive
program constructions, and to create regression tests for discovered concurrency
errors. We have created a proof-of-concept entropy injector implementation and
provide a simple demonstration of how it can be used for creating test cases for
race conditions.
The author believes that entropy injection is a feasible method for addressing
the difficult problem of detecting malign race conditions. It is practical, does
not require new programming paradigms, and works with existing methods and
processes for software development and quality assurance. It does require the de-
velopment of a production quality holistic debugger and injector, and it requires
test engineers to develop injection strategies. This seems like a reasonable price
to pay for solving the increasingly pressing issue that no cost-effective method
for detecting arbitrary race conditions exists.
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